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Systems Principles for Leadership
o In complex systems obvious solutions often fail to produce
intended results -- in fact, often they exacerbate the very
problems they are intended to resolve.
o In complex systems, cause and effect are generally not closely
related in time and space. As managers, we typically assume they
are.
* Complex systems tend to resist attempts to change their behavior.
The most common cause of policy resistance is multiple
"compensating feedback" relationships that attempt to maintain
internal balances despite external interventions.
* Effective policy design requires understanding an organization
and its environment as a unified system so as to shift management
attention away from the large number of low-leverage policies to
the relatively few high-leverage points.
* Such understanding requires an ongoing management education
process. The objective of this education is to shift the style
of thinking within an organization. In an organization intent
upon realizing its creative potential, fostering systems thinking
is a chief function of leadership.
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I INTRODUCTION
A significant part of the managerial revolution that is sweeping the
business world is a growing awareness that the competencies that underlie
successful management and successful leadership are different. An
extensive study of successful leaders in a wide range of fields led
Warren Bennis to conclude that there are four distinct competencies for
successful leadership: management of attention, management of meaning,
management of trust, and management of self (Bennis 1985). Running
through virtually all studies of leadership are common themes. Leaders
are visionaries, who see possibilities and orient themselves toward
creating rather than maintaining. Leaders foster alignment and
commitment. Leaders are teachers, facilitators, "growers" of human
beings. Robert Fritz (1985) discusses the "leader as creator," a person
whose fundamental orientation in life is "to bring into reality that
which never existed before" and to instill this orientation in others.
For the past year-and-a-half, I have been coordinating a research
program involving leaders of some of America's most innovative
organizations. Many of these companies have been pioneers in advancing
more decentralized organizational designs. In many cases, they have
developed a sense of purposefulness and a commonality of values that
reach deeply into the organization. These leaders are unanimously agreed
that vision, alignment, empowerment, commitment and inspiration are the
marks of effective leadership in the type of organizations they seek to
build. But, we also feel that there are subtler aspects of effective
leadership concerned with organizational learning and predominant styles
of thinking in the organization.
The subtler skills of leadership involve creating an environment
where responsibility and wisdom advance together. It is to little avail
to distribute decision-making responsibility broadly throughout an
organization if individuals lack the insight to make effective strategic
decisions. Vision and alignment will dissipate if people begin to blame
one another as soon as problems arise. Enpowerment will wither if
success appears to depend upon events and circumstances beyond the
_1__1_·1____11_1I ------ ---
D-3751-1
organization's control. Effective leaders in the more democratic
organization of the future will not only encourage and inspire people to
trust themselves, take risks, and innovate, they will create a learning
environment in which the lessons of experience can be distilled and
transmitted far more efficiently than in the traditional authoritarian
organization.
Bill O'Brien, president of the Hanover Insurance Companies, says
that:
As we move from the traditional authoritarian organization
to the vision-oriented, value-driven organization, the
skills required of effective leaders will change
dramatically. Just as the "pilot's" skills were transformed
in moving from the horse and buggy, to the automobile, to
the jet airplane, so too must my skills evolve. The
effective leader in a traditional work environment is above
all else a strategist and decisionmaker. In the type of
work environment we are creating at Hanover critical
decisions are made throughout the organization. My job is
more and more becoming that of a teacher and a coach rather
than a decisionmaker.
In particular, we believe that leaders in the future will be
increasingly called upon to develop systemic thinking in organizations.
Systemic thinking is integrative, synthesizing diverse viewpoints in
order to understand the organization as a whole. It is structural
thinking, focusing on the structure of interrelationships among
marketing, manufacturing, R&D, and finance that determine organizational
success.* Systemic thinking deals with "dynamics," showing how short-
and long-term consequences of management actions may be different, even
in the opposite direction. In short, systemic thinking is "general
management" thinking. As organizations distribute general management
responsibilities increasingly broadly, the process of developing systemic
thinking must be made more orderly and efficient than in the traditional
authoritarian organization.
* Fritz (1985), Shandler (1985), and Kiefer (1985) all emphasize the
role of leadership to focus attention on underlying structures.
Systemic thinking represents the discipline that leads to
understanding structure.
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But overcoming a lifetime of training in non-systemic ways of
thinking is not easy. Most of us have been taught from grammar school to
understand problems by isolating symptoms and analyzing the pieces of a
system. For most of us, we were never taught how to integrate our
understandings of different parts of a system into a larger whole.
The Program in Systems Thinking and the New Management Style is exploring
how systemic thinking can be developed within the participating
organizations. This paper shares some of the initial insights from this
program. In particular, it emphasizes developing fluency in basic
systems principles and ongoing exposure to "generic structures" as the
foundation for management education in systems thinking.
II AN ILLUSTRATION INVOLVING MARKET GROWTH AND CAPACITY EXPANSION
The following example deals with generic dynamics involved in the
growth of virtually any type of enterprise. The simple model of growth
dynamics serves to illustrate several important characteristics of
systems:
* The nature of causality in complex systems
* Policy resistance: the tendency of complex systems to resist
attempts to change their behavior through
compensating feedback
better-before-worse behavior
shifting the burden to the intervenor
o Leverage points: the relatively small number of policy changes
that can radiate desirable influences throughout a system.
In complex systems, cause and effect are not closely related in time
and space. However, when problem symptoms emerge in a system, attention
naturally shifts to nearby parts of the system. Declines in marketing
effectiveness are assumed to be due to marketing policies and to
personnel. Overruns in manufacturing cost cause attention to be focused
on production scheduling and purchasing decisions within manufacturing.
Delays in new product development lead to increased pressure on engineers
and engineering managers. Moreover, once local remedies are applied, it
is expected that problems should be solved relatively quickly. However,
30 years of the study of complex social systems suggests that most major
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problems are the results of interactions of diverse forces in different
parts of a system and arise over extended periods of time. Effective
policies are often not obviously related to problem symptoms, and may
achieve their benefits only over an extended period.
The following illustration is concerned with how organizations can
limit their growth far below potential, and even when achieving growth,
may generate considerable instability in financial performance and growth
rate. We begin by considering the self-reinforcing "positive" feedback
relationships that link demand for a company's product or services with
the company's resources to create further demand (feedback loop 1 in
Figure 1).* Increases in demand create more revenues for the enterprise,
provided there is adequate capacity to serve demand. Increased revenues,
in turn, can be invested in resources to generate further demand.
Demand-generating resources include marketing and sales personnel,
advertising, and new product development. In the growth of any
enterprise, this reinforcing process is active.
* Positive and negative feedback loops are the basic structural
building block processes in all dynamic systems. Positive loops
amplify change through self-reinforcing pressures like those in loop 1
in Figure 1. Negative feedback loops are balancing, goal-seeking
structures that respond to change by creating offsetting pressures
that attempt to restore variables to their former values. Examples of
negative feedback are temperature control systems in building, hiring
policies that adjust workforce in a firm toward desired workforce, and
the vast array of processes that maintain homeostasis in any complex
organism.
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FIGURE 1: A Self-Reinforcing Feedback in Market Expansion
However, sustained growth requires a balanced expansion of
demand-generating capacity and capacity to satisfy demand. If growing
demands outstrip the enterprise's capacity to satisfy demand, adverse
changes in competitive variables will limit growth. For example, demand
in excess of production capacity can result in reduced product
availability or lower product quality, or both. Similar imbalances can
develop with respect to service capacity and service quality, either for
a firm in a service industry or for a manufacturing or retailing firm
that needs to provide ongoing service to customers who have purchased
products in the past.
Firms are often unaware of imbalances between ability to create
demand and capacity to satisfy demand because the detrimental
consequences of imbalances are often not immediately evident. For
example, eager salespeople may be promising delivery of new products in
delivery times that are impossible to meet, but the customer has no way
of knowing. The customer waits until the promised delivery time (which
in the case of capital equipment may be several months) before
6
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complaining. Customer dissatisfaction may build for some time before
orders are cancelled and word gets out to potential customers that the
firm is overextended. Moreover, if lengthening delivery times are
building throughout an entire industry, an individual firm's imbalance
between demand and capacity to satisfy demand may be masked by eroding
industry standards.
Figure 2 shows how resources to generate demand interact with
capacity to satisfy demand. The positive feedback loop reinforcing
growth of demand-generating resources is coupled with a "negative
feedback" loop (loop 2) that shows how inadequate capacity to satisfy
demand can limit growth. If capacity is fixed, rising demand will
eventually outstrip capacity to satisfy demand, capacity will be
stressed, and an erosion in competitive variables will result. However,
the effect of this erosion on future demand may not occur immediately,
due to delay in market perception and reaction. Thus, demand may
continue to grow beyond capacity to satisfy demand. This creates the
possibility of overshoot and oscillation in demand, as shown in Figure
2b. It also creates the possibility of the firm reacting to the symptoms
of the eventual downturn without understanding their underlying causes.
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III POLICY RESISTANCE
One of the chief characteristics of complex systems is the tendency
to resist attempts to change their behavior. Noted biologist Lewis
Thomas has said:
When you are confronted by any complex social system, such
as an urban center or a hamster, with things about it that
you are dissatisfied with and anxious to fix, you cannot
just step in and set about fixing with much hope of helping.
This realization is one of the sore discouragements of our
century.
(Thomas 1979)
Policy resistance leads to the frustratingly common managerial experience
of seeing new policies accomplish short-term improvements only to find
old problems reoccurring, of treating problem symptoms only to leave
underlying causes unaffected, and of being drawn into a reinforcing
spiral of intervention and dependency. One of the most persistent
findings of systems research is that problems in complex systems persist
despite repeated efforts directed at their solution:
The world is a complex, interconnected, finite, ecological-
social-psychological-economic system. We treat it as if it
were not, as if it were divisible, separable, simple, and
infinite...
No one wants or works to generate hunger, poverty,
pollution, or the elimination of species. Very few people
favor arms races or terrorism or alcoholism or inflation.
Yet those results are consistently produced by the system-
as-a-whole, despite many policies and much effort directed
against them.
(Meadows 1982)
In effect, this is the fundamental reason for a systems perspective --
the ineffectiveness of policy changes based on a nonsystemic
understanding of problems.
The present illustration points to one of the most common causes of
policy resistance -- compensating feedback. Compensating feedback arises
from unrecognized balancing mechanisms within a complex system. If
symptoms of a problem are part of a balance that a system is seeking to
maintain, altering those symptoms simply causes the system to work harder
to maintain the balance.
II
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For example, around month 40 in the growth of the firm simulated in
Figure 2, demand begins to decline while marketing resources are still
expanding. A crisis in marketing effectiveness develops. The average
demand per marketing resource (for example, sales per salesperson) is low
relative to the growth period. The morale of the sales force is on the
decline. Sales commissions are down. Pressure on the marketing and
sales group is intensifying. Under such conditions, there are a variety
of standard responses of a marketing and sales department intent on
boosting marketing effectiveness. These responses might include an
increased advertising promotion, cutting price, increasing sales
incentives, firing the less productive salespeople, or sales training to
upgrade the average effectiveness of the sales force.
Each of these interventions would be designed to improve a problem
of falling marketing effectiveness. By their nature, they do not
consider the underlying systemic causes of the decline in sales
effectiveness, but rather focus on the obvious symptom of low
performance. There are many pressures that lead to such "symptomatic"
interventions. Even if the management of the marketing and sales group
suspected that the source of the problem lay beyond the immediate
symptoms, organizational pressures to "do something" about declining
performance might still lead to efforts to boost sales effectiveness,
even while managers might be inquiring further into the deeper causes of
the problem.
The results of intervening to boost marketing effectiveness are
shown in Figure 3. In this case, a sales promotion is implemented at
month 46, six months after demand stopped growing. The promotion is
highly successful -- demand increases 15 percent over three months!
However, over the longer term, demand begins to decline again, reaching
its prior depressed level 9 months after the promotion was initiated.
The same short-term benefit followed by longer-term decline occurs if the
firm responds to the crisis with any type of advertising, sales training,
increase in sales incentives, or effort to eliminate the less effective
salespeople and thereby boost the average effectiveness of the
10
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salesforce. The limitation of all such interventions is that they focus
on the symptom of low marketing effectiveness rather than the cause of
the symptom. The system compensates for the symptomatic intervention,
eventually returning marketing effectiveness to its level before the
intervention was undertaken.
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FIGURE 3: A Sales Promotion: boosting marketing effectiveness through
a promotion at month 46 leads to a short-term improvement followed by
a longer term decline.
Returning to the underlying structure that caused the stagnation in
growth, it is easy to see the source of the compensating feedback. The
key structure that leads to compensating feedback is the negative
feedback loop that interrelates demand and competitive variables such as
delivery delay and quality. If a promotion increases marketing
effectiveness, demand will increase (Figure 4). But, if demand is
already near the firm's capacity to satisfy demand, increased demand will
lower the adequacy of capacity, causing further erosion in competitive
variables -- for example, lower quality or higher delivery delays. As
customers come to perceive this decline in quality or availability,
marketing effectiveness will be pushed back down, offsetting the benefits
of the initial intervention.
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FIGURE 4: Compensating Feedback: The feedback loop linking demand,
adequacy of capacity to satisfy demand, and competitive variables
compensates for external changes in marketing effectiveness.
Compensating feedback arises because the negative feedback loop
through marketing effectiveness is seeking to maintain a balance between
demand and capacity to satisfy demand. Over the long-term, no firm can
sell more than it can produce. However, in the short-term, it is quite
possible for sales to exceed capacity. But, eventually, rising delivery
delays, falling product quality, falling service quality, or some
combination of the above sends a clear signal to the marketplace.
Interventions that succeed in boosting marketing effectiveness when a
12
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firm is already near its capacity to satisfy demand can, at best, produce
only temporary improvement.
Examples of compensating feedback abound in the failed interventions
of many of the best intentioned social and organizational programs. If
the problem is inadequate housing, as the urban problem was frequently
viewed in the 1960s, we build more housing. If the problem is excessive
costs of gasoline and heating oil to the consumer, we control gas prices,
as we did throughout much of the 1970s. If the problem is inadequate
national defenses, we invest in further armaments, as we have done for
the past 40 years. If the problem is growing government deficits, we
raise taxes, as we are about to do in the mid-1980s. In each of these
situations, a problem is defined in terms of its most obvious symptoms --
poor housing, high costs of oil and gasoline, inadequate national
defenses, rising deficits -- and an action is taken to correct the
symptom. The implicit assumption behind each of these actions is that a
problem symptom can be controlled by a remedy closely related to the
symptom.
In each case, the underlying system that generated the symptom
compensates for the intervention. In the 1960s, more people moved to the
cities with the housing programs, defeating the intent to provide better
housing for a city's low-income residents. In the mid-1970s,
artificially low energy prices delayed the transition to non-oil energy
sources and undercut incentives for conservation, thereby keeping energy
prices high through limiting energy supply and maintaining high energy
demand. Attempts to improve U.S. national security through increased
arms build-ups have been defeated by increased defense spending by the
Soviets. It is very likely that efforts to reduce government deficits
through higher taxes will slow economic growth, thereby reducing the tax
base and compensating for higher tax rates.
In each of the above examples, the intervention is "successful" if
one looks only at its immediate effects. New housing did improve the
living conditions of the urban poor, until migration flows adjusted to
create more people in need of housing. Energy price controls did reduce
I11
D-3751 -1
the burden on consumers, until further price increases in imported oil
occurred (in 1973, at the time of the first OPEC price increase the U.S.
imported 20 percent of its oil, when the second wave of price increases
came in 1979, the U.S. imported close to 40 percent of its oil).
Building up defense stockpiles does increase perceived national security
(and bolster a nation's bargaining position in international
negotiations), until the other side's arms increase to offset the
advantage. Raising taxes will lower deficit projections, giving national
policy makers the satisfaction of having "done something" about the
problem. It will probably be a year or more before the effects of higher
taxes on economic growth will be felt.
The insidiousness of complex systems stems from the delays in
compensating feedback responses. These delays mean that many obvious
interventions result in better before worse behavior. Just as the
interventions to boost marketing effectiveness in the simple example
above did raise demand in the short-term, so too are there inevitably
many ways to ameliorate problem symptoms in the short-term. Only over
the longer term does the system respond. The multiplicity of short-term
fixes is a great pitfall for political decision making, both in the
public sector and in corporations.
Because the connection between short- and long-term responses is
often unrecognized, intervenors can get drawn into a reinforcing spiral
of intervention. The longer the delay between short- and long-term
response the more likely is the repeated use of an ineffective
intervention. Many developing nations have become completely dependent
on foreign food aid because the delay between the short-term benefit of
foot aid, reduced mortality, and the long-term disbenefit, increased
starvation, is 10 to 20 years. Similar dynamics underlie the increasing
dependency of cities on federal support, the poor on welfare programs,
nations on their military establishment, and of many corporations on
their trusted "intervenors" (for example, the designers of sales
promotions, the "motivators" of increased sales, or increasingly
lucrative sales incentives). The longer an inappropriate intervention is
continued, the harder it can be to break the vicious cycle of dependency.
14
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In complex systems, where cause and effect are often not obviously
related, there are subtle pressures to shift the burden for maintaining
internal balances to the intervenor. What begins as a one-time response
to ameliorate a problem symptom becomes an increasingly necessary ongoing
activity.
IV HIGH- VERSUS LOW-LEVERAGE POLICY CHANGES
A chief benefit of the systemic viewpoint for policy is aiding in
distinguishing high- from low-leverage policy changes. The vast majority
of policy changes adopted within organizations or within larger social
systems are low-leverage. However, understanding the systemic causes of
problems also reveals the possibility for policy changes that do have a
long-term beneficial impact on a system. The only problem is that these
"high-leverage points" are almost always "non-obvious" -- that is, not
closely related in time and space to the obvious symptoms of a problem.
Expanding the simple model of organizational dynamics introduced
above provides an illustration of a typical high-leverage policy change.
In particular, we will extend the model by examining pressures to vary
capacity to satisfy demand. Most corporations engage in long-term
planning for the purpose of defining baseline rates of expansion of
marketing resources and production- and service capacity. However,
planned rates of capacity acquisition are adjusted depending upon current
conditions. For example, during periods of low profitability, when
incoming demands are easily met, capacity expansion is often postponned.
In many firms, the cost and risk involved with major expansions in
capacity means that capacity expansion is not aggressive until there are
clear indications in terms of rising order backlogs or other concrete
measures of excess demand.
Figure 5 shows the feedback structure whereby capacity to satisfy
demand can be adjusted in response to pressure from current competitive
performance. If adequacy of capacity is stressed by demands growing in
excess of current capacity to satisfy those demands, performance of
competitive variables erodes (delivery delays rise, or product quality
III
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declines), increasing pressure to add capacity. As new capacity comes on
line, the firm is more able to meet demand, thereby restoring competitive
variables. The decision to adjust capacity, from this perspective, stems
from attempts to control competitive variables relative to standards for
competitive performance. (Because capacity adjustment is motivated by
attempting to control key competitive variables, it is part of a negative
feedback process.)
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FIGURE 5: Expanded Feedback Structure Involving Market Growth and
Capacity Adjustment
The feedback structure in Figure 5 also allows for competitive goals
to adjust. For example, if a new firm began with a goal of shipping
products in two months but after two years of operation had never shipped
a single product in less than two-and-a-half months, goals for delivery
delay would tend to adjust. Organizations tend, as do individuals, to
16
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adjust goals in light of past performance. These adjustments are often
rationalized as part of the learning process. They are strongly
motivated by the psychological stress within an organization consistently
failing to achieve desired goals. This goal adjustment process is
typically gradual, characterized by incremental shifts, many of which may
not even be formally recognized. In Figure 5, goal adjustment is
represented by a link from the behavior of competitive variables to the
goals for those variables. This causality involves a substantial delay
(indicated by "hash marks"), since goals are adjusted only gradually.
When the more complex structure involving simultaneous adjustments
in resources to create demand and capacity to satisfy demand is
simulated, the behavior that results is surprising (Figure 6). We have
used this generic model of organizational dynamics in training programs
for literally thousands of managers. Invariably, most managers expect
the structure to generate a pattern of growth interrupted by periodic
downturns or plateaus. People expect an unstable growth path because
such growth is characteristic of most organizations, and because this
structure has the capability of generating cycles, as evident in the
preceding section. However, growth is almost always expected because a
set of extremely favorable conditions conducive to growth have been
assumed. There is no limit on the size of the market. There are no
financial constraints on the ability to add capacity. But, even with an
unlimited market and no financial constraints on expanding capacity, the
firm does not grow. In fact, over the long term, there is a tendency for
an initial period of growth to be followed by a gradual stagnation
(Figure 6b).*
* In a computer simulation like that shown in Figure 6, numerous
numerical assumptions are made regarding the specific length of time
delays and the specific aggressiveness of different decisions. Within
the structure of interrelationships shown in Figure 5, it is possible
to vary these numerical assumptions substantially without altering the
basic patterns of behavior shown in Figure 6. Variations in numerical
assumptions can result in growth in demand followed by a plateau, or
growth followed by decline, or even, if one picks numerical values
very carefully, a very modest continued growth. But, given the
present structure, there are no plausible sets of numerical values
that will result in achieving the growth potential of the firm (see
below).
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This generic structure of interactions between marketing and
capacity expansion shows one of the many ways in which firms can
self-limit their own growth. When an organization's growth fails to live
up to expectations, there is a strong tendency to blame factors in the
environment -- for example, increased competition or inability to finance
expansion. All too frequently, firms fail to recognize the leverage that
may exist within their own policy structure to limit growth in demand.
In particular, managers tend to assume demand as an external variable,
particularly when there are demand short-falls. In reality demand
patterns are invariably a result of the interaction of external and
internal dynamics. If management is limited to studying available
statistics, it is virtually impossible to tell the extent to which demand
short-falls are externally versus internally caused. In the absence of
systemic understanding of how firm policies influence demand, managers
consistently underestimate the long-term importance of policies within
the firm. When things go wrong, we tend to blame the environment.
The periodic crises of falling demand and marketing effectiveness
shown in Figure 6 would tend to call forth the symptomatic interventions
described in the preceding section. For example, note that the decline
in demand that begins around month 36 presents the same symptoms of
falling marketing effectiveness discussed previously. These symptoms
would motivate interventions such as sales training or advertising
promotions to boost marketing effectiveness, or might be seen as
justifying the need for increased investment in marketing resources.
However, none of the interventions aimed at the symptom of falling
marketing effectiveness will beneficially alter the long-term
performance. Figure 7 shows the effects of an advertising promotion to
boost marketing effectiveness (begun at month 46) and an increase in the
marketing budget leading to more rapid expansion of all aspects of
marketing resources (also at month 46). Clearly, neither of these policy
changes has any long term beneficial impact. In this structure, policies
aimed at the symptoms of eroding marketing effectiveness are inherently
low-leverage.
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However, there are policy changes which do have the capability of
achieving the growth potential of the firm. It is unlikely that these
policy changes will be discovered without understanding the dynamics that
cause eroding growth. These dynamics are prevalent in a large variety of
organizations but are often unrecognized. They are
subtle, and beyond the grasp of the simplistic mental models of most
managers.
The primary causes of stagnating growth in the present structure
lies in how the firm responds to crises in competitive variables. When
the performace of key competitive variables is poor, there are always two
simultaneous responses. Erosion in competitive variables, such as rising
delivery delays or eroding product quality, send internal signals to
boost capacity. But, they also send signals to the marketplace.
Potential customers learn that the firm is unable to deliver on schedule
or is having difficulties meeting product- or service quality promises.
Whether or not the firm succeeds in growing vigorously over the long term
depends on the relative strength of these two responses. If the firm is
sluggish in adjusting its own capacity when its competitive performance
erodes, there is an implicit shift of control to the marketplace. If the
firm does not adjust its capacity agressively, the customers will make
the adjustment themselves, reducing demand and thereby, in effect,
correcting the problem of the firm's inadequate capacity.
Whenever capacity is inadequate and competitive variables are
declining, there is a narrow "window of opportunity." If a firm fails to
aggressively adjust capacity during these times of crisis, the crisis
will pass. That is, the poor competitive performance will result in loss
of customers, which will lower demand and once again make current
capacity adequate to serve a lower demand.
This dynamic adjustment is shown in the behavior of a typical
competitive variable, delivery delay, relative to its goal (Figure 8).
During the crisis of falling demand and marketing effectiveness centered
around month 40 (Figure 6), delivery delay is high. This creates a
signal within the organization to expand capacity. But delivery delay
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does not stay high indefinitely. It begins to decline and has fallen
back to its goal within about one year. By the end of this crisis
period, the signals that might motivate further capacity expansion are no
longer present, since delivery delay has fallen. The insidiousness of
this dynamic lies in the fact that after a relatively brief period of
time, "the problem goes away." Delivery delays have fallen and the
evidence that capacity is inadequate has disappeared.
The dynamics of interacting capacity expansion and demand
adjustments are controlled by the two negative feedback loops shown in
Figure 5 (loops 2 and 3). These loops give rise to subtle shifts in
control between internal and external forces that determine long term
growth. If the firm is not sufficiently aggressive in adjusting its own
capacity to satisfy demand, the marketplace will make the adjustment for
it. That is, if the internal adjustement to inadequate capacity (loop 3)
is weakened, the external adjustment (loop 2) will pick up the slack.
These dynamics bear out a fundamental management principle: failure to
serve the customer (through aggressively responding to declines in
competitive variables that represent disservice to the customer) will
undermine the long-term success of the enterprise. We can now see that,
from a systemic perspective, this managerial principle arises from the
shifting dominance of the two generic responses to inadequate capacity.
If the firm's internal response through capacity expansion is dominant
(loop 3), demand and supply will be balanced by growing capacity to serve
a growing demand. If the external balance is dominant (loop 2), demand
and supply will be balanced by limited demand to meet limited capacity.
The critical point is that the relative strengths of the two feedback
processes is influenced by the firm's own policies.
In the present structure, there is one particular aspect of the
firm's internal decision making that is most critical for its ability to
expand capacity aggressively. This concerns the way goals for
competitive variables adjust to the past performance of those variables.
This goal adjustment process, which is common in many firms, can
undermine the aggressiveness of capacity expansion by desensitizing
management to poor competitive performance. The degree of goal erosion
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can be modest, and yet the long-term effects significant. Figure 8 shows
that delivery delay goals have eroded only about 30 percent at the peak
of the first delivery delay crisis. (Delivery delay goal has risen from
2 to 2.6 months by month 40.) The goal is still well below actual
delivery delay at the peak of the crisis. Yet this modest degree of goal
erosion is sufficient to slow the acquisition of capacity by reducing the
perceived need to aggressively expand capacity.
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Figure 9 shows the growth that results from an explicit policy to
not alter goals for competitive variables during times of crisis. This
is the only change in structure or parameters relative to the preceding
simulation, in which goals for competitive variables were allowed to
erode slightly during times of crisis. When goals are not eroded, the
potential for growth is realized. After 10 years, the firm's demand is
eight times greater than in the eroding goal case; after 15 years, demand
is 23 times higher. This dramatic shift in performance highlights a key
managerial principle: that eroding goals can undermine the long-term
growth potential of an organization.
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FIGURE 9
The effect of goal setting on long-term growth illustrates the
principle of leverage points. Repeated studies of organizational and
social systems have shown that there are invariably a small number of
policy changes that can have dramatic and enduring effects on
performance. However, the most intriguing feature of these high-level
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policy changes is that they are very frequently not apparent to the
participants in the system. The non-obviousness of leverage points stems
from the nature of causality in complex system: namely, that cause and
effect are not closely related in time and space. The tendency for all
of us to focus on problem symptoms simultaneously leads our focus away
from the very actions and policy changes that might have the most impact
on these symptoms. Only when managers come to understand the underlying
forces that give rise to policy changes do leverage points become
apparent.
The systemic perspective illuminates one of the most illusive
qualities of great leadership: namely, the intuition to focus attention
on the high-leverage policies in a system. While most managers are drawn
into a reinforcing struggle to battle crises, a prime function of
leadership is to catalyze a deeper understanding. This understanding
recontextualizes crises as the by-product of systemic forces. Only by
understanding and working with these forces can the creative potential of
an organization be realized.
V IMPLEMENTING THE SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE
The Program in Systems Thinking and the New Management Style is
working with a group of organizations intent upon making systems thinking
a practical management tool. The field of general systems theory and
systems modeling applied to corporate and public policy issues has been
developing for the past 30 years. It holds great potential as a major
scientific advance. However, the growth of the field has been limited,
by and large, to research and methodological advances. It is time now to
begin focusing attention on translating this body of method and
principles into an ongoing process of organizational learning and
practical tools for decision making.
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V.A SYSTEM PRINCIPLES
The first stage in assimilating the systems perspective is to
distinguish between problem symptoms and problem causes. Managers
continually find themselves drawn into reacting to symtoms, both because
of others' expections and by their own inclinations. In most
organizations the pressures for management intervention far outweigh the
understanding to guide intervention wisely. While the willingness to
tackle important problems is a necessary characteristic of effective
leadership, the wise leader appreciates that a problem should not be
defined by its most obvious symptoms but by its fundamental causes.
Developing a systemic perspective in an organization begins with
helping people to appreciate that
* symptoms and causes may not be obviously related, and
* attempts to manipulate problem symptoms in a complex system
are rarely successful.
Our experience is that various physical exercises and games can be
particularly effective in getting these points across. For many years,
we have introduced managers to the systems viewpoint through a
role-playing simulation of a production-distribution system. Producers,
distributors, wholesalers, and retailers interact in such a way as to
produce periodic inventory stock-outs and over-ordering. The
participants invariably blame each other and the customers for the
instabilities, since this explanation matches the symptoms of build-ups
and collapses in incoming orders and in shipments received. It comes as
a shock to most participants to discover, when the game is over, that the
customer demand was constant and the true causes of instability lie in
the very ordering policies that they themselves were following. This
game-playing experience begins to build awareness that problem symptoms
may be misleading indicators of underlying structural causes.
Another physical exercise created by one of the organizations with
which we have worked illuminates the difficulties of management control.
The exercise starts with two roller skates connected by springs of
different strengths. The "student" is given the relatively simple task
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of controlling one roller skate by manipulating the other. The task then
gets progressively more challenging as additional roller skates are added
to the chain, each connected with springs of varying strengths. By the
time there are a half-dozen roller skates, it becomes virturally
impossible to control one end of the chain by manipulating the other end.
It is then pointed out how much simpler this physical system is than the
task facing a manager trying to control local actions through multiple
tiers of a management hierarchy.
A gyroscope can make a splendid demonstration of actions producing
nonobvious consequences. Because of the complex forces conserving
angular momentum, if one side of the gyroscope is pushed upward, it
actually moves sideways. If the same point is pushed sideways, it moves
downward. Although the simple physical analogy lacks the complexity of
the organizational system (in particular, it lacks the time delays that
obscure the longer term unintended consequences of many managerial
interventions), it makes a strong impression that unintended consequences
are a common characteristic of complex systems.
Once people begin to appreciate the nature of cause and effect in
complex systems, the next stage in understanding involves applying
systems principles like compensating feedback. Compensating feedback
arises from unrecognized balancing processes in complex systems. A
useful question in discerning potential sources of compensating feedback
is to consider the basic balances that are necessary to the health of any
particular organization. For example, in a growing enterprise important
balances involve capacity to generate demand and capacity to satisfy
demand, efforts to develop new products or services and abilities to
develop new products or services, rates of labor expansion and capacity
to assimilate new people into a coherent culture, and desired rates of
capital investment and financial resources for investment. Imbalances in
any of these areas produce stresses that will manifest in diverse problem
symptoms. Attempting to ameliorate these symptoms will have much less
leverage than correcting the underlying imbalance.
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For example, in one of the participating companies in the New
Management Style Program, the president has been attempting to develop
understanding in his organization of the differences between being a
"growth-driven" and "quality-driven" company. A growth-driven company,
in his terminology, is one that pursues sales growth as its primary
objective. When business is going well, it aggressively expands its
marketing and sales effort to capitalize on growth opportunities. On the
other hand, a quality-driven company places service to the customer in
the form of maintaining quality standards as its primary objective. When
business conditions are good, the quality-driven organization invests
aggressively in its capacity to maintain quality for an expanded
business.
This particular company president has been preaching the benefits of
being a "quality-driven" organization for some time. The president feels
that this message must be understood widely because local managers in his
firm have considerable autonomy in pursuing their own policies for
growing their parts of the business. Many of the managers in the company
undoubtedly take the message to heart -- because the president is a good
preacher. But, the president is not satisfied with the degree of
implementation of the philosophy. For many, it remains more a philosophy
than operating practice. The instincts to seize opportunities for
aggressive sales expansion, with little thought toward the longer-term
consequences, are deeply ingrained in most entrepreneurial managers.
The management edict, to be a quality-driven company, lacks impact
becuase it failes to convincingly explain the underlying imbalances that
develop from being a growth-driven company. When new sales grow more
rapidly than the capacity to serve new customers, quality declines.
Current and potential new customers eventually recognize this falling
quality. The additional growth achieved by overly aggressive marketing
and sales expansion is eventually compensated for by increasing customer
dissatisfaction. The challege to bringing the philosophical ideal more
into practice requires deeper understanding of the critical balances
necessary for long-term business success.
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Understanding compensating feedback also leads to focusing on
operating goals, habits, and implicit norms in organizations. Often
compensating feedback arises because an attempted organizational change
contradicts an implicit norm or operating goal. For example, some "new
age" companies that are very successful in promoting an image of health
and well-being for their customers have chronic "burnout" problems with
their own employees. In one firm, the average tenure of managers was
only one or two years because the pace was so frantic. The firm had
great difficulties improving this situation despite a variety of
corrective measures aimed at the problem. The first was a memo sent to
all managers describing the company's commitment to the health and well-
being of its employees and concern over the long-term costs, both
individually and for the company as a whole, of overwork. This memo had
little apparent effect. As the problem continued, a policy of
discouraging after-hour work in the company's facilities was adopted.
This too had little impact, as many ignored the new policy. The policy
was "given more teeth" by closing company facilities at 7 p.m. Not
surprisingly, more people took their work home with them in the evening.
The unsuccessfulness of all of the company's efforts to reduce the
tendency for overwork and management burnout stemmed from a conflict
between this formal corporate goal and an implicit norm in the
organization's culture. The goal of employee health and well-being was
inconsistent with a norm that personal success stemmed from "breaking
through one's own personal limitations." This norm in turn stemmed from
the personal philosophy of the company's founder, which he had been fond
of preaching for many years. What is important, and was not widely
understood by the senior management, was that this philosophy of not
being constrained by one's own self-imposed limitations had been
translated into an implicit belief that success came from the willingness
to continually expand one's personal worklaod. So long as this implicit
norm was operative, efforts to "solve the problem" of overwork and
burnout were doomed to be ineffective.
A similar example of conflict with established norms and operating
goals occurred in an elaborate systems modeling project with a large
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capital goods manufacturer. At the end of a study that lasted for more
than a year, and that involved much of the key senior leadership in the
corporation, it was concluded that the company's production and inventory
policies had been responsible for eroding market share. It was
determined that the company should maintain a steady production rate
during the next business downturn in order to build inventory and improve
its product availability while competitors were cutting back. The policy
change was a tremendous success. The company actually increased market
share during a business downturn and boosted profits substantially.
Unfortunately, when the next major business downturn occurred four years
later, production practices reverted to the traditional policy of sharp
cutbacks and emphasis on controlling inventory costs. The firm continued
to lose market share to foreign competitors.
The reason the successful policy failed to take hold was that it
conflicted with an operating goal woven deeply into the company's
traditions and culture. For many years the president, and later chairman
of the board, had preached the virtues of controlling inventory costs.
In this particular business the unit cost of inventory is very high and
excess inventories can have a dramatic impact on profitability. The fate
of production managers who had failed to control inventories during
business downturns was legend. For the individual production manager
there was no greater fear than to be the person responsible for large
inventory costs. Consequently, despite the proven success of the new
policy of building inventories during a downturn, this policy conflicted
with the traditional practice of successful production managers.
The above examples of thwarted organizational changes illustrate the
"structural conflicts" that arise from multiple inconsistent goals (see
Fritz 1985, Shandler 1985). New policies involving new goals are often
adopted with little recognition of the existence of alternative operating
goals and implicit norms.
Conversely, the importance of "aligning" local goals in an
organization has become one of the predominant themes of the new
management (for example Kiefer and Senge 1984 and Harrison 1984). The
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function of effective leadership to establish superordinate visions and
values is now widely recognized. From a systemic viewpoint, an
overarching vision and value system creates a field in which diverse
local goals are brought into greater harmony, thereby reducing the
potential for goal conflict. Nonetheless, as has been repeatedly
illustrated above, compensating feedback can arise in a great many subtle
forms that go beyond conflicts among explicit goals. It would be unwise
to assume that simply establishing common vision and values is sufficient
to eliminate compensating feedback pressures.
V.B GENERIC STRUCTURES AND MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
Assimilating basic system principles begins the process of systemic
thinking within an organization. Continuing the process involves an
ongoing management education aimed at helping managers to clarify their
mental models and bring these models into deeper harmony with reality.
(This education process needs to focus on key strategic and operational
issues within the organization. It needs to involve a mixture of
"classroom" learning and practical application. And, it needs to be
integrated with daily decision making.)
The members of the New Management Style Program are working together
to develop this type of education within their organizations. The
foundation for this process is a growing library of "generic structures"
-- relatively simple dynamic models of processes that recur in diverse
organizations. The model of interacting market growth and capacity
expansion presented above is an example of a generic structure. Like all
generic structures, it embodies important management principles by
revealing the dynamics that give rise to a principle. The simplest
version of the model (Figure 2) embodies the basic principle that "no
firm can sell what it doesn't produce over the long term." The expanded
version involving capacity adjustments and variable goals for competitive
variables embodies the principle that "eroding goals can undermine the
long-term growth of an enterprise." Further extensions of this basic
structure reveal basic principles of pricing strategy and financial
management (see Senge 1984).
III
D-3751-1
In the New Management Style Program we are working to develop
generic structures dealing with market development, product development,
financial management, human resource management, and organization
development. The structures span a broad spectrum of management issues
ranging from policies to modulate profit cycles and achieve growth
potential to causes of the proliferation of management hierarchy and
leadership development. Each structure embodies an important management
principle. Our belief is that a relatively modest number of generic
structures (well less than 50) should capture a significant portion of
the dynamics of organization growth and stability.
Against this backdrop of generic structures it becomes much easier
to identify and understand the unique characteristics of individual
organizations. Tailoring the generic structures to match the specific
circumstances of individual organizations is the second primary activity
of the New Management Style Program.
For example, one of the companies in the program is in the property
and liability insurance business. When marketing efforts outstrip
capacity to satisfy increasing demands, one of the first consequences in
the insurance business is erosion in the quality of underwriting.
Another unique feature of the insurance business is the delays between
sales revenues and the costs associated with settling claims, which
creates large cash flows and investment of those cash flows. Together,
these two unique characteristics of the insurance industry exacerbate the
instability that arises from the generic dynamics of imbalances in a
firm's ability to satisfy demand. During periods of rapid growth, large
cashflows lead to large investments, the income from which further
increases cash flows. Increasing profitability encourages still further
expansion (both among existing firms and through the entry of new firms).
Overloaded underwriting capacity results in declining underwriting
quality, but the costs of this erosion in quality are only felt over the
long term, as claim rates start to increase. The result is large profit
growth during an upturn and large losses during a downturn, as in fact is
characterized the property and liability insurance industry. These
dynamics can be understood by modifying the generic model.
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Understanding how internal reactions can exacerbate instability can
lead to improved policies for dealing with market fluctuations. The
chief executive of another of the participating companies in the Program,
in a recent address at his stockholder's annual meeting, articulated a
policy to reduce the effects of industry cycles on the firm's long-term
growth. In particular, he argued that most companies react to short-term
pressures on profits in a way that reduces long-term growth:*
Much has been said and written about American management's
propensity to manage for short-term results. And indeed
there is an unspoken virtue in management's ability to
produce smooth, continuously growing financial results.
Investors understandably dislike the uncertainty implicit in
wide swings in earnings, particularly when they have no
other yardsticks by which to monitor performance.
But the only way to stabilize the output results of a
business for unstable growth of demand is to destabilize the
execution of long-term programs and the development of the
organization. This may minimize short-term variations in
earnings but only at the expense of long-term growth and
profitability.
(Ray Stata, Analog Devices, Inc., 1985)
Within this firm, a management education program is being developed
based upon an extended version of the model of corporate growth presented
above. The expanded generic structure, which includes the effects of
profitability on capacity expansion and the delays associated with
building a loyal customer base, shows that if short-term profit
shortfalls lead to reduced capacity expansion, long-term growth and
profitability will be below potential. This structure suggests that
excessive attention on financial measures of performance may be
detrimental to realizing the growth potential of an organization.
In an era when much of American business has drifted toward short-
term profit maximization as the sole criterion of organizational
success,organizations like the Hanover Insurance Companies, Analog
Devices, and the other participants in the New Management Style Program,
* Address at 1985 Annual Meeting, available from company.
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represent a much-needed counterforce. If we fail to develop a long-term
systemic perspective to guide private enterprise, it is extremely
unlikely that we will succeed in doing so for public policy. Several
years ago, the annual report of another of the participating
organizations, the Kollmorgen Corporation, argued that American business
had a special responsibility to nurture values of freedom and respect for
the individual:*
In a nation drifting slowly away from these concepts of
freedom, and individual worth, and ultimate responsibility
for one's own destiny, it is ironic that business may be the
most free institution left in America. We believe that
business must show the way by example to the rest of our
institutions.
(Kollmorgen, 1979)
Surely, a similar opportunity presents itself to business to demonstrate
the practicality of a systemic perspective for effective leadership.
* 1979 Annual Report, availabe from company.
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